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With fears of famine growing all around them, the Bus of the Estates General of Burgundy 
wrote in desperation to the contrSleur ginhal, Pontchartrain, in December 1693.' In their 
letter, they claimed that starvation stalked the streets of the towns and that in Beaune 
people were already dying. When these unfortunates had been found, 'on les avoient 
ouvertes et trouvks remplies d'herbes'. Confirmation of the pitiful state of the population 
is not difficult to find. According to the testimony of M. de Combes, directeur des fumes du 
roi in the Bresse b~ur~uignonne,  who spent three weeks touring the countryside in the 
summer of 1691, the region was 'bien gueux ... I'on n'y vend du sel qu'h force de prests', 
while the poor 'se servent d'herbes et de racines amZres pour mettre dans leurs souppes qui 
equipollent le sel'.' Even the governor, the prince de Condk, visiting Dijon for the meeting 
of the Estates in May 1691, informed Pontchartrain that 'je suis obligk de vous dire que j'ay 
trouvC plus de miskre icy que je ne ~ r o ~ o i s ' . ~  He added that in 'tous les villages de la route 
que j'ay faite, je n'ay pas veu un seul habitant qui ne m'ayt demand6 l'aumone'. These grim 
reports would be followed by many more during the next twenty-five years as Burgundy, 
like many other regions of France, reeled under the effects of the failed harvests and 
famines of 1693-4 and the arctic winter of 1709.4 Severe frosts killed the vines upon which 
the prosperity of the province depended, and further calamities followed with pestilence 
striking livestock in 1713-14.5 These natural disasters coincided with the Nine Years War 
(1689-97) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-13) which saw unprecedented fiscal 
demands rain down upon the province. As one of the leading pays d'itats, Burgundy 
possessed its own provincial administration which had to meet these challenges. This paper 
will examine how an apparently impoverished province was able to finance these costly 
wars, by studying the fiscal administration of the Estates under Louis XIV. 
Until comparatively recently, the history of the provincial estates in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries had been strangely neglected.6 With the publication of important 
l [Dijon,] Arrchives] D[Cpartementales de la] Crate d']O[r] C 3138, fols. 458-9, 23 December 1693. 
The klus wrote a very similar letter to the governor, Condk: ibid., fol. 458. 
[Paris,] Nrchives] Nrationales] G7 157, fols. 210-13, Combes to Pontchartrain, 19 July 1691. 
' AN G7 157, fols. 180-1, Condk to Pontchartrain, 4 June 1691. 
Two impressive recent studies of these events are M. Lachiver, Les annies de mzsire: lafamine atr 
temps du grand roi (Paris, 1991), and W. G. Monahan, Year of Sorrows. B e  Great Famine of 1709 
in Lyon (Columbus, Ohio, 1993). 
The sources are vague about the precise nature of the problem, but see the remonstrances of the 
parlement of Dijon, AN U 1062, 19 August 1715. 
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studies by J. Russell Major,' William Beik8 and James C ~ l l i n s , ~  that picture has begun to 
change, and we are now far better informed about the relationship between the crown and 
the provincial estates during the reign of Louis XI11 and in the course of the first two 
decades of Louis XIV's personal rule. In his majestic study of representative institutions in 
the early modern period, Russell Major has argued that Louis XIV, while not hostile to 
provincial estates as such, was determined to ensure outward submission to his wishes.'' 
During the 1660s and 1670s traditions of resistance to royal demands, or more frequently 
of bargaining with the king's commissioners about taxation, were gradually eroded, and 
Major has argued that the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV dominated 'the remnants of 
the once vibrant, popular institutions'." 
In his justly celebrated study of Languedoc, Beik has offered a compelling model of 
how the monarchy achieved the political compliance of the local Estates. He has 
emphasised the degree of cooperation uniting the nobility, urban officeholders and the 
crown. In return for public obedience to the king, the local elites were given considerable 
latitude in their administration of the province and had their prestige and social authority 
reinforced.I2 Although the fiscal burden supported by Languedoc increased from 
approximately 1.2 million livres in 1628 to over 5.0 million livres by 1643, matters were 
more complicated than they at first appear." The remarkable figure achieved in 1643 was 
not maintained and it was not until 1691 that a similar burden was imposed. Moreover, as 
Beik has demonstrated, the increase in taxation was fitful and in 1653, or during the first 
decade of Louis XIV's personal rule, tax levels were comparatively modest. More 
importantly, these rising revenues were not being shipped off to Versailles. Instead, much 
of the money raised never left Languedoc, and it was used to fund, amongst other things, 
the military itapes, the construction of the canal du midi and the pensions and salaries of 
local officeholders and dignitaries.14 With taxation being employed for the benefit of the 
province, the potential for opposition was correspondingly reduced, and any residual 
resentment was dissipated by the opportunities for the local elites to enrich themselves 
from the collection and distribution of these funds. According to Beik, Louis XIV's success 
The first and last book to be written about the estates of Burgundy in this period was A. 
Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIL? Situation politique et administrative de fa Bourgogne de 1661 
ci 1715 (Paris, 1844), though see R.J. Bonney, Political Change in  France under Richelieu and 
Mazarin, 1624-1661 (Oxford, 1978), pp. 344-83. Other provinces have fared rather better, 
notably Brittany: A. Ribillon, Les Etats de Bretagne de 1661 Li 1789 (Paris, 1932), remains a classic 
text. The present author is currently researching a wider study of the Burgundian Estates 
between 1661 and 1790. 
' J. R. Major, Representative Government in Early Modern France (London, 1980), and his recent 
From Renaissance Monarchy to Absolute Monarchy. French Kings, Nobles and Estates (Baltimore, 
1994). 
W. Beik, Absolutism and Society i n  Seventeenth-Century France. State Power and Provincial 
Aristocracy i n  Languedoc (Cambridge, 1985). 
J .  B. Collins, Classes, Estates and Order in  Early Modern Brittany (Cambridge, 1994). 
' O  Major, Representative G o u m m e n t ,  pp. 631-3. 
*l  Ibid., p. 671. 
l2 Beik, Absolutism and Society, esp. pp. 223-339. 
l3  Ibid., pp. 140-6. 
l4 Ibzd., pp. 245-70. 
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in affirming the authority of the monarchy was therefore dependent upon a close alliance 
with existing social elites. James Collins, in his recent study of Brittany, has made similar 
claims, stressing the extent to which the crown cooperated with leading members of 
provincial society. For Collins, the Estates were less concerned with the historic privileges 
and liberties of Brittany than the 'defense of real economic and political interests'.15,As in 
Languedoc, it was the tax-paying peasantry which lost out as a consequence of this 'cozy 
little relationship' of noble landlords, the legal class and the crown.16 
These studies of the pays d'htats reflect the general shift in historical thinking about 
the nature of absolute monarchy that has occurred over the last twenty-five years.17 There 
is no doubt that the emphasis upon the creation of a consensus between the king and his 
leading subjects makes the comparatively tranquil domestic political scene of the later years 
of his reign more comprehensible. Yet the vast majority of these studies have been 
concentrated upon the period before 1688. Few have ventured beyond the earlier glorious 
years of the sun king to  examine the final twenty-five years of his reign when war and 
natural disaster brought France close to invasion and military collapse. It was during this 
period that the fiscal burden was heaviest and the consensus of 'absolutism' put to  its 
sternest test. An examination of the administration of Burgundy during this troubled 
period increases our understanding of how the local financial system weathered the storm 
and at the same time developed techniques that would endure without serious modification 
until 1789. 
At the beginning of Louis XIV's personal rule, the Estates General of Burgundy continued 
to  exercise the principal responsibility for the administration of the province." As in 
Brittany and Languedoc, the Estates was composed of representatives of the three orders.19 
The clergy was led by the bishops of Autun, Auxerre, Chilon-sur-SaBne, and Macon, plus 
20 abbe's of the local religious houses, 22 doyens and deputies of cathedral chapters and at 
least another 24 prieurs of abbeys and congregations. The chamber of the nobility was open 
to  all gentlemen who possessed a fief in the province and who could provide proof of their 
four quarters of noblesse. Finally, there were 72 deputies, usually the maires or  e'chevins of 
l5 Collins, Classes, Estates, and Order, p. 174. 
l6 Ibd., p. 175. 
l' For a representative sample, see: F. X. Emmanuelli, 'Pour une &habilitation de l'histoire 
politique provinciale: l'exernple de I'assemblCe des communautks de Provence, 1660-1786', Revtre 
historque de droitfiangais et etranger, 59 (1981), 431-50; S. Kettering, Patrons, Brokers and Clients 
in  Seventeenth-Century France (Oxford, 1986); R. Mettam, Power and Faction in Louis XIVS France 
(Oxford, 1988); and D. Hickey, 'Tailles, client2le et absolutisme: le Dauphink aux XVI et XVIIIe 
sikles', Revue d'histoire moderne, 39 (1992), 263-81. 
l8 The paper will deal with the administration of the duchy of Burgundy and will not include the 
financial records of the comtej of Micon, Charolles and Bar-sur-Seine, or the so-called pays 
adjacents of Bresse, Bugey and Gex. 
l9 For details about the composition of the Estates, see: D. Ligou, L'intendance de Bourgogne 2 l a j n  
du XVTle siicle. Edition critique du mimoire pour l'instruction dtr dtrc de Botrrgogne (Paris, 1988), 
pp. 180-7; Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV, pp. 7-16; and M. Bordes, L'administration 
provinciale et municipale en France au XV7lle sikle (Paris, 1972), p. 106. 
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the principal towns, to represent the third estate. As the Estates were in session for only a 
few weeks in any three-year period, enormous responsibility was invested in the 
commission intermidiaire, known as the chamber of dus, which acted in their name. 
Composed of a member of each of the three orders, two deputies from the chambre des 
comptes of Dijon, the maire of that town and an t!Zu du roi chosen by the king, it was the 
dus who dominated the administration of Burgundy. In addition to overseeing the levy and 
collection of taxation, the raising of loans and other fiscal matters, the e'lus organised the 
conscription of the local milice, supervised the construction and repair of roads and public 
buildings and played an active part in the procurement of grain during times of dearth. 
Although they only assembled once every three years, the Estates had preserved the 
crucial right to approve all taxation levied in the province. Throughout the first decade of 
Louis XN's  personal rule, they maintained the tradition of bargaining with the king's 
representatives, the governor and intendant, about the province's fiscal contribution. The 
five royal direct taxes levied in Burgundy, collectively forming the taille, were the don 
gratuit ordinaire (sometimes referred to  as the octroi ordinaire), the don gratuit 
extraordinaire, the taillon, garnisons and the subsistance et exemption des gens de guerre." The 
two dons gratuits were accorded by the Estates at their triennial assembly, while the taillon, 
garnisons and subsistance et exemption were subject to royal commissions agreed by the e'lus 
and approved retrospectively by the Estates.'l The taillon and garnisons were annual fixed 
sums of 71,550 livres and 86,000 livres respectively and remained unchanged throughout 
the reign. The strbsistance et exemption was in fact divided, with the first part consisting of 
the province's contribution to the subsistance of royal troops during their winter quarters 
and the exemption des gens de guerre, as its name suggests, paid to prevent troops entering 
the province - a bargain the king invariably ignored. After 1661, the price of these 
commissions rose gradually, with the exemption, costing 112,000 livres in 1662, rising 
thereafter to 200,000 livres by 1680. The cost of the subsistance also rose to 345,000 livres by 
1679 before falling to 300,000 livres in 1685.'~ There was no further change in the amounts 
of these charges until the Revolution. While there was frequent grumbling about the 
commissions, it was the don gratuit extraordinaire which remained the touchstone of local 
attitudes towards royal taxation because of its symbolic importance at meetings of the 
Estates, and it is helpful to  examine a number of examples. 
The meeting of the Estates of January 1668 illustrates clearly the procedure i n v o l ~ e d . ~  
Almost immediately after the opening ceremonies, the three orders deliberated in their 
respective chambers about the offer to be presented to the governor, the prince de CondC. 
20 For a useful discussion of the taille in Burgundy, see P. d'orgeval, La taille en Bourgogne au 
X W e  sizcle (Dijon, 1938). 
C .  Arbassier, L'absolutisme en Bourgogne. L'intendant Bouchu et son action financ&e, d'apr2s sa 
cowespondance inkdite, 1667-1671 (Paris, 1921), p. 109. 
22 Thomas, Uneprovince sous Louis XIV, p. 148. 
23 The following is based upon the records of the chamber of the nobility, ADC0 C 3039, fols. 
16-47. A more detailed account of the protocol is provided by F. Dumont, Une session des ktats de 
Bourgogne. La tenue de 1718 (Dijon, 1935), pp. 15-25. 
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The third estate, whose interests were most directly at stake, was the first to reach a 
decision, sending two deputies to the chambers of the clergy and noblesse. They delivered a 
speech stressing the poverty of the people, and proposed a don gratuit extraordinaire of 
500,000 livres. Both of the privileged orders were more generous, the clergy offering 
600,000 livres and the nobility concurring. It was this offer which was presented to the 
governor. To  put these figures into perspective, it is important to note that the dons 
gratuits extraordinaires of 1662 and 1665 had been fixed at 1,050,000 livres and, as war had 
been declared in 1667, the chances of the government accepting less were slight. 
Condd had, in fact, been given a commission to secure 1.5 million livres in 1668, 
albeit with the understanding that 1.2 million livres would suffice.24 The offer of 600,000 
livres was not surprisingly rejected, and the governor made the wry observation that it was 
remarkably 'disproportionate' given the 'grandes affaires de Sa Maje~tk ' .~~  Further 
deliberations followed, and the nobility voted to raise the offer to 700,000 livres, plus an 
additional 53,000 livres for the don gratuit ordinaire. They were, however, careful to attach 
the condition that the king recognise 'toutes les nouveautds qui ont estk establoit pendant 
la triennalitk dernier et qu'il n'en sera establie aucuns pendant la prdsente'. These 
complaints were directed at the summoning of the Estates in January 1668, rather than in 
May of that year as should have been the case, and the increases in the price of the 
commissions of the subsistance and exemption. While not of immense significance in 
themselves, these complaints reveal the tendency of the Estates to attach conditions when 
consenting to  taxation. Condk rejected the offer without more ado, pointing out that the 
province could hardly expect to pay less in time of war than it had during the peace.26 
For the deputies of the third estate, who had wanted to make a lower offer of 
700,000 livres which would include the don gratuit o~dinaire,~' this second rejection was the 
source of great consternation. They sent deputies to 'suppl6er tr2s humblement M. 
l'evcque d'Autun de se mettre 1 la teste d'une deputation gknkrale pour faire du tr2s 
humbles remontrances h S.A.S. sur la misire et impuissance du tiers e~tat ' .~'  These appeals 
to the privileged orders fell on deaf ears and they combined in favour of an improved offer 
of 800,000 livres, which was again rejected. A further bid of 900,000 livres fared no better, 
and the third estate again tried to persuade the bishop of Autun to head a deputation to the 
prince. More discussions and renewed offers saw the figure eventually reach 1 million livres 
in don gratuit extraordinaire, plus the 53,000 livres for the don gratuit ordinaire, although 
conditions were reattached. Even this effort failed to sway CondC, who wanted the 
conditions dropped and a further increase in the offer. 
These negotiations, which had already dragged on for over a week, eventually 
prompted the bishop of Autun, when making his unsatisfactory bid, to ask what the king 
actually wanted. The governor replied that he had orders to accept nothing less than 1.2 
million livres. Despite this sudden illumination of the situation, there was no noticeable 
'' Thomas, Uneprovince sous Louis XIV, p. 37. 
ADCO C 3039, fol. 22. 
26 The outbreak of war presumably accounts for the king's decision to summon the Estates in 
January rather than May. 
27 The don gratuit ordinaire was usually fixed at 53,000 livres, although it could be subsumed within 
the payment of the don gratuit extraordinaire. 
ADCO C 3039, fol. 23. 
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enthusiasm to comply. After the obligatory discussions and much shuffling between the 
chambers, an offer of 1,050,000 livres plus the extra 53,000 livres of don gratuit ordinaire 
was forthcoming. CondC agreed to write to the court with this offer and to employ his 
good offices, although the Estates took the precaution of announcing their willingness to 
pay the full amount should his efforcs fail. Yet they were sufficiently stubborn to reattach 
the condition that in such an eventuality the king grant them some means of paying the 
sum.29 It had, therefore, taken eight days of tough bargaining before Condk could send this 
offer to the king, and it still fell short of his original instructions. The royal reply was far 
from accomrn~da t in~ .~~  The Estates were given the choice of either paying the full amount 
of 1.2 million livres in don gratuit extraordinaire, or of assuming responsibility for the 
military ktapes. For a frontier province such as Burgundy, which was an almost permanent 
thoroughfare for French troops, this was no idle threat and the Estates lost no time in 
agreeing to pay the don gratuit in full. 
The difficulties the government had faced in winning the consent of the Burgundian 
Estates in 1668 are instructive. In order to secure the don gratuit, the crown was obliged to 
indulge in over two weeks of public bargaining, and only achieved complete obedience by 
threatening the much worse fate of responsibility for the military &apes. As for the Estates, 
their attempts to negotiate a lower don gratuit had clearly achieved nothing, and their 
efforts to attach conditions to the various offers had met with a frosty response. While all 
three orders had proved reluctant to vote the government its taxes, it was the third estate, 
whose interests were most directly at stake, which had been most committed to 
resistance." The events of January 1668 were typical of the conduct of fiscal negotiations in 
the pays d'btats in the third quarter of the seventeenth century." The crown usually 
received the funds it had requested, but it was obliged to coerce and cajole in order to  do 
so. Only rarely, as the meeting of the Burgundian Estates in 1658, did the king receive a 
flat refusal." O n  that occasion, the Estates had stubbornly resisted the threats and 
entreaties of the governor and had been exiled for their pains. 
By these standards the assembly of 1668 had been a success, and a very similar 
pattern emerged three years later in May 1671.~ The discussions opened with an offer of 
700,000 livves for the don gratuit, and the familiar cycle of refusals and fresh offers, usually 
accompanied by conditions, was quickly established. Once again, it was the deputies of the 
third estate who at each stage sought to convince the privileged orders 'qu'il estoit 
impossible absolument d'accorder davantage'. After four days of fruitless bargaining, the 
Estates, following a suggestion from the clergy, changed tack. Rather than offer a fresh bid, 
29 Ibrd., fols. 34-5. 
' O  Ibid., fol. 46. 
' These events mirrored those during the meeting of the Estates held in June 1662 when, as Condk 
made clear, the third estate had tried to limit the size of the don gratuit. He excused their 
behaviour in a letter to Colbert on the grounds that they 'portent presque toutes les 
impositions'. G. B. Depping, ed., Correspondance administrative sous Le r@ne de Louis XIV, 4 vols. 
(Paris, 1850-5), i. 426-3 1. 
" A similar pattern of behaviour was observed by Beik, Absolutism and Society, pp. 134-7, in his 
study of Languedoc. 
'' Major, From Renaissance Monarchy to Absolute Monarchy, p. 300. 
l4 The details of the meeting are drawn from ADC0 C 3039, fols. 51-8. 
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they voted to go directly to Condi 'et entendre ses instructions'. He told them that their 
current offer of 900,000 livres was unacceptable, but clearly failed to give the precise figure 
required because yet another bid of 950,000 livres was turned down before he announced 
that 'si on offroit un million il employeroit ses offices' on behalf of the province. Even this 
specific request was unable to coax more from the recalcitrant deputies: they stuck fast for 
950,000 livres and were content to rely upon the good offices of the prince, who promised 
to inform the kingJ5 
Despite the failure of the Estates to offer the 1 million livres demanded by the king, 
they found support not only from Condk, but also from the intendant, Claude Bouchu. He 
informed Colbert 'que cette province en a un t r b  grand besoin et que la disette d'argent est 
si grande qu'on n'y en voit presque plus'.36 These efforts bore fruit and Colbert and Louis 
XIV were not only content to accept the offer of 950,000 livres, but even to reduce that 
sum by 150,000 livres. According to Bouchu, the Estates heard this news 
avec une joie si extraordinaire ... qu'il nous seroit difficile de vous I'exprimer et il n'a 
pas fallu d'kloquence pour leur persuader qu'ils ne peuvent jamais faire une condition 
meilleure pour eux qu'en se soubmettant A tout ce qu'il plait au roy d'ordonner et que 
S.M. a bien plus de bontk et prend plus de soucy de leurs fortunes qu'eux mimes.37 
Even if we allow Bouchu a certain degree of poetic licence in his description of events, the 
'joy' of the Estates is easy to understand. In 1668, a higher offer had been rejected and the 
king had threatened to make the province pay for the military htapes. The acceptance of a 
lower amount and then the unsolicited reduction of that sum was a very pleasant surprise. 
Not that it was a complete bolt from the blue, because it had not escaped the attention of 
the Burgundians that similar 'remises' had recently been granted to the Estates of Artois, 
Brittany and Languedoc.38 The return of peace after the brief War of the Devolution 
(1667-8) had made such royal generosity possible and had probably influenced the decision 
of the Estates to offer less than the 1 million livres demanded by Condi. 
Whatever the truth of the matter, the assembly of May 1671 marked a watershed in 
relations between the crown and the Estates of Burgundy. At its next meeting, in May 
1674, the Estates abandoned their traditional ritual of bargaining. Instead, they voted 
'd'une seul voix' to offer the king 1 million livres in don gratuit extraordinaire, plus the 
53,000 l ives  of don grattrit ~rdinaire.'~ When they announced their intention to  the 
governor, he accepted their offer and then, like a conjuror pulling a rabbit from his hat, 
announced that his majesty would be content with 900,000 livres, including the don gratuit 
ordinaire. He also informed the deputies that the king had granted a number of other 
minor fiscal sweeteners, notably the discharge of the outstanding debts incurred when 
implementing Colbert's manufacturing and navigation projects. Finally, Condk expressed 
the king's willingness to grant the Estates a crue of 50 sols on the salt tax to contribute 
towards the payment of the don g r a ~ i t . ~ '  Once again, the official records speak of the 
IS Arbassier, L'intendant Bouchu, p. 114. 
See the letter of Bouchu to Colben of May 1671, cited by Arbassier. 
37 Ibid., pp. 114-15, Bouchu to Colbert, 29 May 1671. 
'' Ibrd.,p. 114. 
ADC0 C 2998, fol. 1. As Beik has demonstrated (Absolutism and Society, pp. 136-7), similar 
tactics produced an almost identical situation in Languedoc. 
40 The crues were an integral part of the Estates' budgets and are examined in detail below. 
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'transport de joye' that this news produced, and such swift and tangible reward for 
according the don gratuit without any haggling contained a clear lesson for the Estates. 
After 1674, there was no further recourse to public bargaining and the voluminous 
records of subsequent meetings of the Estates always begin with what has been described as 
an act of 'aveugle dkfkren~e',~' namely the immediate and unanimous vote of the don 
gratuit. This ritual submission to the authority of the king brought its theatrical response 
with the governor announcing that his majesty would be content with a slightly lower 
amount. In sending the news of the prompt obedience of the Estates, the governor also 
promised to use his good offices with the king. The results could sometimes be impressive 
and in 1709 he secured a further reduction of 100,000 livres, which meant that the Estates 
paid 800,000 livres rather than the 1 million livres actually voted." Such concessions 
reinforced the message that obedience would be rewarded, and with the crown using the 
governor as a trusted intermediary it further reinforced his prestige and reputation in the 
province. 
These, then, were the tactics which were initially responsible for ending the 
tradition of public negotiations about royal fiscal demands in Burgundy. As the king was 
providing very real incentives for cooperation, Russell Major's argument that 'the will of 
the Estates had been broken'43 by 1674 implies a draconian aspect to royal policy that was 
in reality missing. The interpretation of Arbassier that Louis XIV had 'conquis les ktats par 
sa gCnCrositC'44 describes the situation more accurately and also underlines the fragility of 
the royal triumph. In 1674, there had been no new edicts to restrict the opposition of the 
Estates, and unlike the parlements they maintained the regular practice of presenting their 
cabiers de remontrances to the ki11g.4~ The potential for opposition was, therefore, 
undiminished and, as Thomas has noted, there were renewed rumblings of discontent at 
the end of Louis XIV's reign.46 Moreover, when considering the dons gratuits after 1674, it 
is impossible to escape the conclusion that the Estates had struck an excellent bargain. 
Thereafter there was an implicit assumption that their 'spontaneous' offer of 1 million 
livres would be accepted automatically and the sums involved remained unchanged until 
the Revolution. The Estates also based their actions upon the unspoken condition that the 
king would renounce part of the don p t u i t  and provide some assistance in paying for it. 
The triumph of Louis XN was, therefore, more apparent than real, and further 
evidence can be cited to illustrate that beneath the public subservience to the king, the 
Estates retained their old spirit of independence. At the assembly of 1685, for example, the 
deputies of the third estate were sufficiently concerned about the rising tax burden to 
prepare a mernoir 
41 Thomas, Uneprovince sous Louis XIV, p. 44. 
42 ADC0 C 3049, fols. 264-5. 
43 Major, Representative Government, p. 640. He repeats this argument in his From Renaissance 
Monarchy to Absolute Monarchy, p. 344. 
* Arbassier, L'intendant Bouchu, p. 115. 
45 The remonstrances were presented every three years during the 'voyage d'honneur' of the klus to 
Versailles: Dumont, Une session des hats, pp. 129-52. It is true that the parlements did make 
remonstrances to Louis XIV, especially towards the end of his reign, but they were undoubtedly 
more tightly controlled than at any other period in their history. 
46 Thomas, Uneprovince sous Louis X I K  pp. 51-2. 
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pour presenter h S.A.S. monseigneur le duc et pour la suplier de reprhsenter au roi 
combien les charges de la province sont augment&. Les dons gratuits ne se payent aux 
anniles 1671 et 1674 que sur le pied de 800,000 livres au lieu qu'aprks en paye un million 
de livres." 
Similar complaints were made about the increase in the cost of the commissions for the 
subszstance des troupes and exemption des gens de guerre and for the cost of the military e'tapes 
which the king had stopped refunding since 1674. 
The existence of such a memoir in the official records of the chamber of the third 
estate belies the public image of unanimous deputies offering a million Iivres to their 
sovereign and then being thrown into a 'transport de joie' when he deigned to accept. 
Another indication of simmering discontent was provided by the remarqaes of the alcades 
written in 1694. The seven alcades were appointed from within the three chambers of the 
Estates, with two members each from the clergy and nobility and three from the third 
estate.48 Their brief was to assemble just prior to the triennial meeting of the Estates and to 
examine the administration of the e'lus. Although they met for a few weeks only, the 
alcades had access to the fiscal records of the ilus and their prkcis of that information, which 
was presented to the chambers for discussion, provides an invaluable source for the study 
of fiscal policy. The remarques written in the last years of the seventeenth century were 
thought lost," but I have been fortunate to discover their observations for the period 
1637-1715 and their reports provide the central focus of this paper. 
In 1694, the alcades began their remarques with a withering attack upon the burden 
of taxation supported by the province.50 They declared that it would be easy 'de prouver 
que depuis cinquante ans ce qu'on appelle ordinairement les charges de la province a esd 
presque doubK', and even dared offer the observation that the Estates would be better 
served 'de rksister avec route la fermetC possible aux nouveautCs que I'on propose'.51 The 
evident discontent of the alcades, whose arguments not only formed an important part of 
the discussions of the chambers, but also contributed to the cahiers des remontrances 
delivered to the king, reinforces the argument that the Estates were far from broken by 
Louis XIV in 1674. 
Far more damaging to the long-term vitaIity of the Estates as a representative 
institution was the decision to make the office of maire venal in August 1692.~' The Estates 
responded by successfully petitioning the crown for the declaration of 5 June 1696 which 
'incorperi aux ktats' the offices of 'maire perpetuel'. What this meant in practice was the 
control of these offices by the e'lus who, subject to the approval of the governor, were now 
free to pick and choose the maires as they saw fit. Prior to 1740, the governor continued to 
exercise enormous influence over their choice, but thereafter the ;/us were left largely to 
" ADCO C 3049, fol. 104. 
48 Little has been written about the alcades in this period, but some useful details are provided by 
Ligou, L 'intendance de Bourgogne, p. 137, 187, and Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV, pp. 
12-13,20,22-3. 
49 Ligou, L'intendance de Bourgogne, p. 137 
50 ADCO C 3041, fols. 110-23. 
Ibid., fol. 112. 
52 Bordes, L 'administration provinciale, pp. 232, 240. 
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their own  device^.^' From the point of view of the Estates, the change was crucial because 
the deputies of the third estate were usually the maires of their towns. As we have seen, 
they had been to the fore in resisting the increase in the don gratuits before 1674, and it was 
in their chamber that signs of dissent were detected in 1685. Moreover the alcades who had 
protested in their remarques of 1694 had been appointed at the assembly of 1691 - before 
the changes to the status of the maires came into effect. Thereafter any deputy of the third 
estate who showed signs of independence at the Estates risked being called to account by 
either the governor or the ilus. 
It seems reasonable to assume that these ties prevented the deputies of the third 
estate from offering more than token resistance to taxation as it soared ever higher after 
1694. Moreover the absence of any genuinely representative element to the Estates helps to 
explain why the institution gradually lost the respect of Burgundians in the eighteenth 
century. In the great battles between the Estates and the parlement of Dijon during the 
reign of Louis XV the public sided with the magistrates, and by 1789 the administration of 
the Estates was detested.54 The political emasculation of the third estate contributed 
significantly to these changes, but it was typical of Louis XIV's government that the most 
serious blow to the independence of the Estates occurred by accident, as the result of fiscal 
expediency, not design. If the third estate had been politically neutered, the same could not 
be said of the privileged orders. In order to explain why they offered no serious resistance 
to  the mounting taxation caused by the wars of Louis XIV, it is necessary to take a close 
look at the financial management of the province. 
One of the most effective methods of illustrating the growing fiscal burden supported by 
Burgundy is to examine the triennial accounts.55 These were prepared by the alcades and 
give the overall figures for the income and expenditure of the province during the 
triennalite' for which they were appointed. Chosen at the same time as the dus, the alcades 
were expected to verify the honesty, efficiency and conduct of the administration. As both 
the hlus and the alcades were replaced every three years, there was little opportunity for the 
accumulation of professional accounting or administrative e~pe r i ence .~~  Yet despite the 
obvious potential pitfalls of leaving the task of censoring the hlus to amateurs, the 
remarques bear testimony to much public spiritedness, commonsense and honest 
endeavour. In their comments, the alcades ranged across the full spectrum of provincial 
administration, offering comments upon such issues as the state of the roads, public 
buildings, quarrels with neighbouring provinces, and making suggestions such as for the 
After the death of the duc de Bourbon, there was an interregnum until the young prince de 
CondC could assume what was, in effect, his family's hereditary office of governor of Burgundy. 
He never established the tight control over the province that had been enjoyed by his 
predecessors. 
54 I am currently working on a broader study of the Estates in this period. 
55 These figures have been compiled from the remarques of the alcades contained in ADC0 C 
3039-42,3049,3303. 
56 Of the elus, only the eh du roi was likely to serve for two or more triennalitej in succession. 
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establishment of a university in Dijon." However, it is their discussion of financial affairs 
that is especially pertinent to this paper. 
The alcades made observations about the taxation, borrowing and spending policies 
of the &S, and it is important to examine the sources of their information. For general 
administrative matters such as the overseeing of public works, or the raising of loans, the 
minutes of the meetings, and of the decrees issued by the &INS in the course of their 
triennalite' were a~ailable.~' These registers also contained copies of both incoming and 
outgoing correspondence with ministers in Versailles, the governor, and the officers of the 
Estates. Taxation records, on the other hand, could be verified from the rolls drawn up 
annually by the Bus, which were meticulously recorded not only down to the last denier, 
but even, in some instances, to the level of the individual taxpayer. There was clearly likely 
to be a wide margin between what the dlus ordered in Dijon and what was actually passed 
from the receivers in the individual bailliage to the treasury of the Estates. As a result, the 
alcades also verified the accounts of the trisorier g&h-al, notably the sums actually paid to 
him by the receivers - which could then be checked against the accounts declared by the 
trksorier gdnb-al for processing by the chambre des comptes of D i j ~ n . ~ '  The data compiled by 
the alcades thus provides a close insight into the workings of a fiscal system that has been 
unfairly described as the most inefficient in the history of F r a n ~ e . ~  
Figure 11.1 contains the estimates compiled by the alcades for the income and 
expenditure of successive triennalitei, and the overall figures are strikingly precise. As each 
year was calculated separately, there is some doubt about the accuracy of the data for every 
third year because of the timing of the meetings of the Estates. O n  a number of occasions, 
for example in 1668 and in 1679, Louis XIV advanced the date of the assembly by more 
than six months. This meant that the totals, especially of the tax receipts, are 
underestimated because the receivers in the bailliages were at least six months, and often 
more, in arrears with their payments.61 In order to combat abuse, the alcades, after 1697, if 
not before, began to include a specific clause in their remarq~es, instructing their successors 
to  oversee the outstanding sum and account for it in their r e m a ~ ~ ~ e s . ~ ~  Thanks to this 
administrative device, it is usually possible to confirm the overall figures for any given 
triennalitd by combining the reports of the original and succeeding alcades. 
" For a sample of these remarques, see ADCO C 3041, C 3303. 
58 These registers are available for the whole reign: ADCO C 3 103-65. 
59 The registers of the alcades provide a good insight into their procedures, and ADCO C 3303, fols. 
155-71 offers a clear example of how they computed their figures. 
That was the opinion of Thomas, Une province sous Louis XIV, pp. 140-1, who spoke of the 
'voies brutales d'un fisc aveugle'. The papers of the alcades cast serious doubt upon his 
interpretation, and they suggest that the more favourable description of d'orgeval, La taille en 
Bourgogne, pp. 1-35, for the eighteenth century could be applied to Louis XIV's reign. 
61 This was a perennial problem for the Estates, and the evidence of these delays was used by 
Thomas to sustain his argument that the fiscal administration was corrupt and inefficient: 
Thomas, Uneprovznce sous Louis XIV, pp. 135-43. There is no doubt that the receivers profited 
from holding on to tax revenue for as long as possible because they were able to use it for their 
own ends. The ilus, for their part, claimed that the delay was due to the problems of tax arrears, 
which they tolerated in order to prevent excessive pressure being brought to bear on the 
peasantry. 
62 ADCO C 3041, fol. 173. 
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What is immediately apparent from the triennial accounts for 1637-1716 is the 
dramatic escalation of the amounts handled by the Estates. The last two triennalitb of 
Louis XIIIYs reign, 1637-9 and 1640-2, when the costs of the Thirty Years War were at 
their height," saw the Burgundian budget hovering around the figure of 4 million livres. 
Although our evidence is unfortunately incomplete, the data available suggest that the 
situation remained remarkably stable prior to 1670, with the highest triennial expenditure 
the 4,858,120 livres of 1645-7. Not surprisingly, it was the wars of Louis XIV that broke 
this period of fiscal calm. By the end of the Dutch War in 1679, the triennial figures had 
risen to  just under 6 million, but it was not until the Nine Years War that really dramatic 
increases were experienced. The first triennalite' of the conflict saw the budget reach 7.3 
million livres and from then until the end of the war the figure never fell below nine 
million. The brief peace of 1698-1701 made no discernible difference to the situation, and 
from the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession total income and expenditure 
soared further. From just over 11.05 million livres during the triennalitt! of 1703-5, 
expenditure rose to  12.5 million livres for 1706-8 and to 12.96 million livres between 1709 
and 1711.64 Even the return of peace, in 1713, brought little respite and the triennial budget 
of 1714-16 topped 15 million livres." It was altogether fitting that the year of Louis XIV's 
death, 1715, saw the highest levels of spending of his entire reign, with annual income and 
expenditure levels of 7,15 1,940 livres and 7,049,75 1 livres respectively. 
As the late seventeenth century is generally seen as a period of stagnation rather 
than inflation, this threefold increase in the sums being handled by the Estates of Burgundy 
is impressive. In order to examine the causes in more depth, it is necessary to  assess the 
extent to which royal demands on the province were responsible. As we have seen, there 
was no great change in the value of the five impositions that had been traditionally levied 
in Burgundy. What then were the new costs that were driving up the expenses of the 
Estates? 
In order to answer this question, it is helpful to examine the balance sheets prepared 
for the meetings of the assembled Estates by the alcades. If we take the model remarq~es 
written by the alcades for the assembly of 1691, the breakdown of spending becomes 
clear.66 As table 11.1 demonstrates, of a total expenditure during the triennalitiof 7,455,715 
livres, no less than 3,867,251 livres (51.87 per cent) was consumed by payments to the royal 
treasury, or other central caisses such as those of the receveurs desfinances, receveur g&&al 
du taillon, or tre'sorier extraordinaire des g~erres.~' When that sum is broken down further, 
Beik, Absolutism and Society, p. 141, has shown that taxation in Languedoc during the Thirty 
Years War peaked in the period 1640-3. For a discussion of the financial costs of the war in the 
kingdom as a whole, see R. Bonney, The King's Debts. Finance and Politics in France, 1589-1661 
(Oxford, 1981), pp. 159-92. 
64 ADCO C 3042, fols. 67-223. 
65 ADCO C 3049, fols. 346-50. 
ADCO C 3041, fols. 37-40. These remarques are the most detailed that I have found, probably 
because the preceding alcades had been criticised for not doing their job thoroughly enough. I 
have used their evidence both to show the breakdown of the budget for one triennalite'and as the 
basis for broader comparisons of the evolution of the component parts of income and 
expenditure throughout the reign. 
67 By way of comparison, 6,871,650 livres (55%) of a total expenditure of 12,504,439 livres was paid 
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Table 11.1 
Expenditure of the Estates of Burgundy, 1689-91 
Type of expenditure 
Royal taxes 
Province 
Individuals 
Amount (livres) 
3,867,251 
1,181,774 
2,406,690 
as in table 11.2, we can see that the five traditional taxes forming the taille accounted for 
2,875,632 livres (75.71 per cent) of the total with a further 800,000 livres (21.08 per cent) 
allocated to  the payment of a secoun extraordinaire towards the war effort. The outstanding 
120,072 livres (3.16 per cent) consisted of funds provided for the restoration of the 
fortifications in the towns of Auxonne and Chalon-sur-Sabne, plus the gages paid to  the 
mar4cbaussies and the coureurs despostes. That these sums are classed as taxation, rather than 
Figure 11.1; Triennial Budgets for Burgundy, 1639 - 1716 
triennial period 
i = inwrne (minions of livres tournois) X = expenditure (millions of liwes tournois) 
Source: ADC0 C 3039 - 42, 3049, 3303 \ s w a n n \ m  o ESFDB 1997 
as being to the advantage of the province, is, so far as I can tell, explained by the fact that 
the payments were made directly to the royal treasury." We do, however, need to 
remember that the royal treasury was a very loose term. Of 800,000 livres identified as 
payments to the crown for 1695, some 370,000 l ives  was assigned 'pour les pensions de 
to the royal treasury during the trienmlite'of 1706-8: ADCO C 3042, fols. 155-6. Unfortunately, 
the alcades were rarely as precise in their breakdown of the payments made by the Estates. 
ADCO C 3133, fols 450-4. 
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Table 11.2 
Royal taxes in Burgundy, 1689-91 
Type of tax Amount (livres) 
Subsistance 900,000 
Taillon 214,632 
Don gratuit extraordinaire 850,000 
Don gratuit ordinaire 53,000 
Exemption 600,000 
Garnisons 258,000 
Secours extraordinaire 800,000 
Gages 99,144 
Fortifications 20,928 
Msgr le duc, Msgr le prince de Conty et autres', and other sums would pass directly to the 
munitionnaires of the armies of Italy and Germany.69 
It was, therefore, the secours extraordinaire that represented the most significant 
innovation. This contribution had first been demanded in June 1689 as the crown looked 
around for the means of meeting the cost of the Nine Years War. Given the effort required 
to coax the Estates to  pay the don gratuit extraordinaire in both 1668 and 1671, it is 
instructive to note that the sum demanded in secours was only 50,000 livres less, as the 4lus 
lost no time in informing the go~ernrnent .~~  When they were summoned to Versailles in 
order to hear the king's instructions, the ilus initially resisted, claiming that the province 
was incapable of paying. More significantly, they argued that in the absence of the Estates, 
not due to  meet until May 1691, they had no legal right to sanction such taxation, adding 
'que l'usage estoit qu'en de pareilles cas on assembloit les estats'." It was the governor, 
CondC, who acted as intermediary during the negotiations with the contrdleur gbh-al, and 
when he informed the dlus that the king was prepared to  accord them the proceeds of the 
octrois levied on the river Sabne, their opposition collapsed. According to the records of 
their deliberations, the dlus reasoned 'que S.M. pouvoit establir lesd. octrois en entier et les 
delivrer a des personnes qui en feroient la levke avec rigueur', the Estates, on the other 
hand, would act 'd'une maniere plus douce et plus convenable au bien publique, et qu'il 
seroit plus facile d'en obtenir la suppression si on la jugeoit avantageuse 1 l'avenir'. 
These virtuous hopes were never to be fulfilled and the octrois remained an integral 
part of the province's fiscal system until the revolution. By granting the octrois, the crown 
provided the necessary collateral against which the ilus could borrow to pay for the secours 
extraordinaire. It was a pattern that would be repeated with great regularity thereafter. 
Louis XIV demanded a further secours of 450,000 livres from the Estates in 1691 and 
identical sums were requested every three years until the end of the war.72 It was this 
practice of demanding extra resources from the province, while offering the means to 
69 ADCO C 3139, fols. 488-9. 
70 ADCO C 3134, fol. 190-1. 
" Ibzd.,fol. 190. 
'' ADCO C 3030, fols. 232-3. 
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borrow at least part of the sum, which provided the foundation of the fiscal relationship 
between Louis XIV and the Estates of Burgundy. 
The second slice of spending identified by the alcades of 1689-91 was classified as 
being to 'l'avantage des peuples, et h l'ornement et commoditC de la province'.73 In total, 
(see table 11.1), this represented 1,181,774 livres, or  15.85 per cent of overall expenditure, 
the vast majority of which was consumed by the military itapes (see table 11.3)." As we 
have seen, Louis XIV, urged on by C ~ l b e r t , ' ~  had threatened to force the Estates to meet 
these expenses in 1668, prompting an increase in the don gratrrit instead. It was only a 
temporary respite because the crown soon proved unwilling to  reimburse the ktape~.'~ The 
strategic position of Burgundy made this a serious matter. The neighbouring province of 
Franche-ComtC was a Spanish possession until 1678 and the movement of troops required 
to  accomplish its conquest provided a fiscal and administrative headache for the ilus. Even 
after the addition of Franche-ComtC to the kingdom, troop movements remained 
significant because armies engaged in Germany and Italy during Louis XIV's later wars 
regularly passed through the province. 
Table 11.3 
Spending within the Province of Burgundy, 1689-91 
Type of expenditure 
Etapes 
Etapes costs 
Roads 
Repairs 
Statues 
Palais d ';tat 
Haras 
Wolves 
Amount (livres) 
892,570 
5,177 
154,754 
28,045 
50,000 
25,572 
23,000 
2,476 
The costs of feeding and accommodating the soldiery should theoretically have been 
met by the crown, although as with so much else these funds, when they were 
forthcoming at all, were nearly always in arrears." In 1674, with unpaid debts mounting, 
the plight of the towns and individuals obliged to shelter the troops reached crisis 
proportions, and the Estates agreed to advance the sums required to reimburse the ;tapes. 
Although they were reluctant to  abandon the principle that the king should pay the 
troops, they nevertheless set up a system whereby towns or individuals met the initial cost 
73 ADC0 C 3041, fols. 37-9. 
74 During the triennalitk of 1706-8, for which we have comparable figures, this account consisted of 
1,172,5 11 livres (9%) of overall expenditure of 12,504,439 limes. 
75 Arbassier, L'intendant Bouchu, pp. 109-11, quotes a letter from Colbert to the intendant of 
Burgundy, Bouchu, of January 1668 which makes it clear that he was thinking of shifting this 
expense onto the province. 
76 Thomas, Une province sous Louis XW, pp. 153-63, offers the most thorough discussion of the 
system of ;tapes in Burgundy. 
" Zbzd., pp. 153-7. 
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incurred and then applied to the 6lus for compensation. The details of the new system were 
contained in the r2glement g6niral des &apes of 1677 which was castigated by Thomas, who 
claimed that 'le systi.me entier reposait sur un mauvais principe'.78 What he particularly 
disliked was the practice of refunding after the event, rather than by providing sufficient 
funds in advance. It is a valid criticism, but his doubts about the efficiency and probity of 
the e'lus are less c~nvincing.'~ 
Complaints were certainly sent from Burgundy to  the contr6letrr ginha1 in Paris, 
and Thomas claimed that the e'lus preferred to deal with the itapes from the comfort of 
their office in Dijon, thus facilitating the fraud and abuse of their inferiors. However, in a 
letter to the contrbleur ginha1 in May 1687, the intendant, dYHarlay, informed him that the 
itapes for 1686 had been fully refunded and he could not understand why murmurings of 
discontent had reached Paris.'O He suggested that the slight delay in payment was an 
advantage because it allowed time for the verification of claims, which were checked 
against the routes authorised by the military command. Moreover, in direct contradiction 
to  the later claims of Thomas, d'Harlay wrote 
qu'enfin les officiers de la chambre des klus puissent se rendre dans les villes qui doivent 
recevoir les remboursements, pour assister eux meme de la distribution qui s'en fait en 
leur presence suivant un usage qu'ils pratiquent depuis quelques annkes trks utilement 
pour empescher l'abus que les maires et echevins des villes en pourroient faire si 
personne n'kclaircit leur conduite h cet kgard. 
D'Harlay was under no obligation to protecl the e'lus against their critics and his 
description of administrative practice is c o n ~ i n c i n g . ~ ~  He also informed Pontchartrain that 
the e'tapes for the last seven months of 1686, some 272,000 livres in total, had been paid in 
full by 15 May 1687. Such a comparatively rapid response was not exceptional. The ilus 
divided the year into two parts, the first of five months and the second of seven months, 
and typically repaid the e'tapes within six months of the end of any given period.8z The 
delay for those incurring the expense was undoubtedly inconvenient, but the reliability 
with which the province met its obligations offered at least some compensation. Finally, 
we should note that in their remarques of 1691, the alcades identified only 5,177 limes as 
'frais' for the administration of no less than 892,570 livres of e'tapes during the preceding 
three years.83 
In more general terms, the transfer of responsibility for the e'tapes from the crown to 
the Estates was an effective method of tapping the resources of the province. As we have 
seen, persuading the Estates to increase the don grattrit, or  other taxation was difficult, and 
Ibid., p. 158. 
79 Ibid., pp. 158-63. 
AN G7 157, fol. 55, d'Harlay to Pontchartrain, May 1687. He did, however, suggest that the 
complaints had originated in the town of Montbard, which had a dispute with the hlus about the 
precise routes taken by the troops. 
'l It is true that criticisms were being regularly voiced by the alcades at the end of Louis XTV's 
reign, which suggests that the conscientiousness recorded by d'Harlay had waned, ADCO C 
3042, f01~. 79-80'312-13. 
" As can be deduced from the registers of the chamber of the ilus: e.g., ADCO C 3133, fols. 
414-16; C 3134, fols. 95-6; C 3135, fol. 430. 
ADCO C 3041, fols. 39-41. 
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by simply failing to honour his earlier commitments Louis XIV forced the Burgundians to 
dip into their own pockets. The sums involved were far from negligible. In 1675, 286,476 
livres was disbursed and similar amounts were required until the end of the Dutch Waraa4 
Even during peacetime the burden was heavy with 272,000 livres spent in 1686 and 158,210 
livres in 1688. With the outbreak of the Nine Years War, these costs were swollen, rising 
from 300,000 livres in 1689 to at least 450,000 by 1690.~~ 517,869 livres were spent in 1691 
and a further 633,863 livres in 1692 .~~ Similar amounts were consumed throughout the final 
war-torn years of the reign.*' According to the accounts compiled in 1718, the province 
had spent some 11,086,408 livres on the itapes between 1676 and 1715, an annual average of 
284,266 livre~.~' 
What is perhaps most remarkable about these figures is the fact that the htapes were 
regularly costing more annually than the don gratuit extraordinaire. Although the money 
spent was staying within the province, the key issue was how the Estates would raise the 
necessary revenue. If the burden had been met by increasing the tazlle, then it could be seen 
simply as a disguised form of royal taxation. In the short term at least, this was not the 
case. As with novel taxes such as the secours extraordinaires, the blus tried to avoid passing 
the cost directly onto the taillables. Instead, they again resorted to borrowing, using the 
income from the octrois on the S a h e  and the salt tax as collateral, and it was the interest 
payments on these sums that were added to the taille. 
Of the remaining 284,027 livres described by the Jlus as spending on behalf of the 
province between 1689 and 1691, nearly half, 154,754 livres, was for the upkeep of public 
highways (see table 11.3). Repairs of public buildings, particularly the auditoires of the local 
bailliuges, accounted for another 28,045 livre5, and embellishments to the Pahis des Etats 
and the Place Royale of Dijon cost no less than 75,572 livres, two-thirds of which had been 
spent on an equestrian statue of the king.89 A further 23,000 livres was consumed by the 
Harm maintained in the province at the behest of the king. Finally, 2,476 livres was paid 
out as bounty for the killing of wolves. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the Estates paid a cash reward for each head presented, and such was the 
generosity of their offer that by 1769 Burgundy had become the focus for the kingdom's 
hunters, with animals killed in other provinces making the lucrative journey to D i j ~ n . ~ '  
It is clear that if we remove the itapes from spending on behalf of the province, the 
immediate advantage to the population was limited. The destruction of wolves, the upkeep 
of public buildings and highways were all worthy in themselves, but the sums involved 
84 ADCO C 2982. 
85 AS can be seen from the letter of the dcr roi, Quarrl., to Pontchartrain, AN G7 151, fol. 127, 
10 February 1691, and the notes of the alcades, ADCO C 3041, fol. 38. 
86 ADCO C 3137, fols. 139-40; C 3138, fols. 140-54; C 3041, fol. 34-57. 
During the triennalitks of 1703-5 and 1706-8, a total of 941,270 livres and 1,172,511 livres was 
spent on the itapes respectively: ADCO C 3042, fols. 76, 157. 
88 Dumont, Une session des Jtats, p. 9, n. 2. 
89 The Estates were far from enthusiastic about the statue and managed to delay its inauguration 
until 1720! For details of this amusing and informative incident, see R. Mettam, 'Power, Station 
and Precedence: Rivalries among the Provincial Elites of Louis XN's France', Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, 5th ser., 38 (1988), 57-8. 
90 According to the remarques of the alcades for that year: ADCO C 3306, fol. 144. 
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were tiny. Moreover, the petitions presented to the Estates and the remarques of both the 
alcades and the conseils des ltats make it clear that the roads in the province were in a pitiful 
state.91 The minister of war was constantly demanding improvements in order to allow the 
passage of troops and the Estates themselves used the excuse that the roads were impassable 
to prevent moving the unwanted statue of the king from Paris to  Dijon.92 It was not public 
works that provided the real benefits to Burgundians but the fiscal system itself, as is 
revealed by the third element of overall spending (shown in table 11.4), that incurred to 
the advantage of individuals. 
Table 11.4 
Payments to Individuals, 1689-9 1 
Type of expenditure 
Interest 
Gifts/salaries 
Gages 
Elus 
Treasurer and receivers of taille 
Chum bre des comptes 
Frais of royal treasury 
Milice 
Officers of salt tax 
Miscellaneous 
Amount (livres) 
1,188,778 
233,045 
260,946 
154,673 
78,060 
122,079 
125,439 
48,414 
49,256 
150,000 
N o  less than 2,406,690 livres (32.28 per cent) of total expenditure for the triennalite' 
of 1689-91 was allocated to  this acc~unt .~ '  Nearly half of that sum, 1,184,778 livres (49.23 
per cent) was needed for the interest repayments and 'arr6ragesY on debts contracted by the 
province. A total of 260,946 livres (10.84 per cent) was consumed by the gages of the offices 
charged to  the Estates, and 154,673 livres (6.34 per cent) for the expenses of the e'lus which 
included the costs of their voyage d'honneur to  the court." Some 233,045 livres (9.69 per 
cent) had to be set aside to cover the various pensions, gifts or official expenses of those 
rewarded by the Estates for services to  the province, such as the 3,000 livres sent to  the 
secretary of state in Paris, or the 1,000 livres given to both the intendant and first president 
in Dijon9' Other beneficiaries of the fiscal system included the chief treasurer and the 
receivers of the taille employed by the Estates (78,060 livres), the officers of the cbambre des 
comptes of Dijon (122,079 lives) and the administrators of the salt tax (49,256 livres). 
9' The remarques of 1700 were particularly damning: ADCO C 3041, fol. 253, claiming that the 
main thoroughfare from Auxerre to Dijon was a threat to life and limb, even endangering the 
governor himself. 
92 Mettam, 'Power, Station and Precedence', p. 58. 
93 ADCO C 3041, fols. 39-40. The only comparable figures available are those for the triennalite'of 
1706-8 when 4,460,278 livres (36%) out of total spending of 12,504,439 livres was recorded as 
being made as payments to individuals: ADCO C 3042, fols. 155-6. 
94 The voyage took place once during each triennalite' for the business of the Estates and the 
presentation of their remonstrances. 
95 ADCO C 3134, fol. 20, provides an indication of some of the other recipients. 
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Clearly the significance of this expenditure lies in the fact that the vast majority of it 
was to the advantage of members of the Estates, or of the local elites. Lending to the 
Estates was a sound investment, while the payments of gages, pensions, gifts and the 'frais' 
of the administration all found their way into the pockets of local dignitaries or 
officeholders. One of the principal reasons for the acquiescence of the Estates in the face of 
the fiscal onslaught caused by Louis XIV's wars was the opportunity to profit either 
directly or indirectly from government policy. Burgundy, as we might expect, had much in 
common with the other pays d'btats, especially Brittany and Languedoc. There were, 
however, important differences in terms of how the Burgundian Estates financed its 
spending and it is necessary to turn to the other side of the balance sheet, the revenues of 
the province. 
Table 11.5 
Income of the Estates of Burgundy, 1689-91 
Revenue type Amount (livres) 
Taille 4,387,351 
Crtres 833,321 
Borrowing 879,000 
Pn'ncipaux 902,600 
Octrois 105,000 
Individuals 247,134 
As table 11.5 illustrates, the Estates drew their revenue from six main sources. By far the 
most important was the taille, which was apportioned by the ;!us and collected on their 
behalf by the receivers in the individual bailliages. While we always need to be conscious 
that there could be large discrepancies between what was ordered on the taille rolls and the 
actual sums collected, these figures nevertheless provide a sigificant indication of the 
financial pressure on the province. For the triennalite' of 1689-91, no less than 4,387,351 
lives was levied in tai!les, providing just over 60 per cent of total income.' To  put these 
figures into some form of perspective, it is helpful to look at the evolution of the taille in 
the late seventeenth century. In figure 11.2 it has been possible to compile an unbroken 
run of taille rolls stretching from 1677 to 1763, and a number of interesting patterns 
emerge.97 Before 1677, the figures are incomplete, but the most reliable data from 1668 and 
1671 suggest that the taille levied annually amounted to  approximately 1,450,000 l ~ v r e s . ~ ~  
Thereafter the evidence is much clearer. In 1677, the e'lus ordered the collection of 
1,610,988 livres of tailles, but, with the exception of 1680, the end of the Dutch War saw a 
slight fall to an average of 1,469,804 livres during the peace of 1678-88. 
As we might expect, it was the two great wars at the end of the reign which saw the 
most dramatic increases in taxation. After 1689, the total never fell below 1.4 million livres 
96 ADCOC3041,fol.41. 
97 ADCO C 4854-4953. 
98 ADCO C 4854-5, 4858-9. The exact amounts were 1,463,079 livres in 1668 and 1,434,159 livres 
in 1671. 
JULIAN SWANN 
and during the Nine Years War (1689-97) averaged 1,708,044 livres; nor should we forget 
that the capitation had been introduced in 1695, further increasing the tax burden. The 
peace of Rijswick in 1697 brought a brief respite and the i h s  were able to bring the taille 
down to 1,423,821 livres in 1700. However, it was quickly followed by the War of the 
Spanish Succession and further increases that forced the &/us to order the collection of 
2,013,849 livres in the ill-fated year of 1709. By 1712 that figure had risen to an all-time 
high of 2,361,274 livres. With the return of peace, the trend was reversed and the taille 
averaged 1,822,722 livres for the period 1714-24. It was not until 1788 that the taille would 
once again reach the dizzy heights of 1712, but little of that revenue would ever be 
collected. 
Not that the taille was the only burden for the province's taxpayers. In 1695, Louis 
XIV introduced the capitation, which apart from the brief interlude of 1698-1701, 
remained in place until the Revolution. Unfortunately, it has not proved possible to assess 
its impact before 1701, but thereafter the rolls make clear its di~tr ibut ion.~~ In 1701, the ilus 
were 'invited' to accept an annual 'abonnement' of 1 million livres for the capitation of the 
province.100 Of this, 180,000 livres was to be levied in the adjacent territories of Bresse, 
Bugey, Valrome~ and Gex, with the remaining 820,000 livres to be found by the duchy and 
comtej. The government permitted the i h s  to raise 400,000 livres (later increased to 
416,000) by a loan secured against the octrois on the River Sa8ne for 1708-9. It was also 
stipulated in the royal letters patent of May 1701 that 52,500 livres was to be levied on the 
province's noblesse by the eh of that order and four gentlemen chosen by the governor. 
The officers of the parlement of Dijon were assessed at 43,404 livres and an additional 
64,202 livres was to be collected from the other courts and legal and administrative officers 
in the province. The remaining sum of 273,934 livres was to be levied on the taillables. 
From these figures it is clear that the increase in taxation on the taillables during the 
War of the Spanish Succession was even more striking. If we join the rolls of the taille and 
capitation together (as in figure 11.3), the peak year of 1712 saw no less than 2,660,741 
livres levied, an increase of 81 per cent over the average figure for the taille during the 
peacetime decade of 1678-88. Moreover, it was the taillables who were to pay the 
'arrkrages' on the 400,000 livres borrowed by the 6lus to pay the abonnement.lO' Finally, the 
government imposed an additional tax, the d i x i h e ,  in 1710, whose combined rolls 
mounted to 691,554 l ives  by 1717.1°2 
It is noticeable that in 1701 the ~ r iv i l e~ed  orders in the province had been obliged to 
contribute the significant sum of 160,106 l ives  as its capitation payment. However, any 
hint of equality in carrying the burden would prove shonlived. Ever resourceful in 
expedients, the government demanded, in August 1710, that the ilus buy out of 400,000 
livres of its annual payment for the capitation. The province was obliged to raise 2,400,000 
livres for the crown and in return the king reduced the annual abonnement to 600,000 livres 
ADCO C 5688-5702. 
ADCOC5573. 
'O' Ibd. 
Io2 ADCO C 5808. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find the figures for 1710-16, although it 
seems reasonable to assume that a similar amount was levied in each of those years. Indeed, when 
the dixi2me was reintroduced in March 1734, the government negotiated an abonnement with the 
khs of 700,000 l ives.  
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in perpetuity, of which 420,000 livres was to be paid by the duchy and c0rnt6s.~" As usual, 
he granted a further extension of the province's rights to the octrois for the years 
1737-1748 to act as collateral for the necessary borrowing. None of the benefit from this 
reduction in the capitation was passed on to the taillables. Approximately 300,000 livres had 
been collected annually from this source between 1701 and 1710, and, if anything, there 
was a gadual increase thereafter with 358,286 livres levied in 1715.1°4 The beneficiaries 
were the creditors of the Estates and the privileged classes. The nobility saw its share of the 
tax fall from 52,500 livres to 44,250 livres, and it was reduced further to 31,000 livres in 
1714.1°5 The sovereign courts, who had seen their share of the capitation reduced by a sixth 
since 1703, also benefited from the new abonnement. Not that they had been contributing 
the full amount, as the nobility, parlement and the chambre des comptes of Dijon were all 
continually in arrears on their capitation payrnent~.''~ 
After 1710, it would not be an exaggeration to talk of the capitation as a surtax on 
the taillables. Of 420,000 livres sent to the royal treasury, around 350,000 livres was raised 
from these taxpayers and they in turn supported the interest charges on the 2,400,000 livres 
that had been borrowed on behalf of the crown. Any benefit from the reduction of the 
abonnement for the capitation had been passed on to the privileged groups and the creditors 
of the Estates, who were frequently one and the same. 
It is interesting to note that, although direct taxation was rising, it was declining as a 
proportion of overall income. During the triennalite' of 1677-9, the alcades estimated that 
the Estates raised 71 per cent of its revenue from the t~ille,'~' but by 1689-91 the 
comparable figure was 61 per cent.''' In those subsequent years for which we have reliable 
data a consistent pattern emerges. In 1693, 1696 and 1700, the five taxes forming the taille 
accounted for exactly 44 per cent of total annual revenue, suggesting that the ilus were 
attempting to keep direct taxation at a consistent level relative to its overall income. By 
1701, the taille represented 38 per cent of annual income, but the introduction of the 
capitation meant that another 12 per cent was raised from direct taxation, making exactly 
50 per cent in total. It was a significant proportion, although some twenty per cent lower 
than in 1679. Finally, the revenue derived from direct taxation in the triennalith of 1714-16 
. - 
was approximately 46 per cent, which would seem to confirm this trend.lo9 
If direct taxation paid by the taillables was the principal source of income for the 
Estates, the latter also had other important methods of raising revenue. According to the 
alcades, during the triennalite' of 1689-9 1 (table 11.5), the province had received 247,134 
livres (3 per cent of total revenue) from individuals condemned by the chambre de jrrstice of 
'03 ADCO C 5573, edict of August 1710. 
'04 ADCO C 5702. 
'OS ADCO C 5573. 
'06 Ibd. The parlement of Dijon owed 6,302 livres in 1707. 
'07 ADCO C 3049, fols. 42-5. 
'OS ADCO C 3041, fols. 39-40. 
'09 This estimate has been calculated using the estimate for total revenue of 15,439,232 livres 
provided by the alcades (ADCO C 3049, fols. 349-50) and the tdille and capitation rolls for those 
years (ADCO C 4904-6, 5701-3). There is a slight margin for error because I have assumed that 
31,000 livres was raised annually from the noblesse and 20,000 l i ves  from the officers of the 
sovereign courts as their contribution to the capitation. 
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Figure 11.2: The Taille levied in Burgundy, 1668 -1763 
Source: ADC0 C 4854 - 4953 \swann\swagOOl c ESFDB 1997 
1661 whose fines had been assigned to the  estate^.^'^ As far as we can tell, this was an 
isolated windfall, although similar sums may have been received earlier in the reign. Far 
more important was the income raised from loans. For the triennalite' of 1689-91, the blus 
had borrowed 879,000 livres which, when joined to 'plusieurs principaux que la province 
devoit auparavant' of 902,600 livres, produced no less 1,781,600 livres. This imposing sum 
represented 24.22 per cent of the Estates' total revenue and reveals the extent to which 
borrowing was an integral part of its fiscal system. All the available evidence suggests that 
these amounts were not exceptional. The alcades of 1694 assessed borrowing in 1693 as 
1,341,200 livres, 32 per cent of total income for that year; the remarques of 1697 recorded 
borrowing a massive 1,757,460 livres in 1696, 42 per cent of total revenue;"' in 1700 a 
figure of 872,000 livresH2 (27 per cent of total revenue) was quoted; and in 1701 the 
imposing sum of 1,290,966 livres,l1' or 35 per cent of annual income. 
Clearly, there were considerable fluctuations in the scale of borrowing, but the 
ability of the blus to raise such large amounts on what was effectively an annual basis 
provides ample testimony to their creditworthiness. These loans were floated both within 
the province and in Paris and even the most cursory glance at the names of those lending 
funds reveals the presence of the whole spectrum of the noble elite, robe and sword, 
courtiers and provincials, and of the local bourgeoisie.l14 Indeed the desire to lend money 
"O ADCO C 3041, fols. 41-2. 
'l1 Ibtd., fol. 250. 
'l2 Ibid., fols. 310-11. 
"' Ibid., fols. 314-15. 
114 Amongst those listed as creditors of the Estates in 1692 were M. Benign6 Bouhier, president in 
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Figure 11.3: The Taille and capitation levied in Burgundy, 1701 - 1715 
I o taille taille and capitation 
Sources: ADC0 C 4854 - 4953, 5688 - 5702 \swann\swagWZ s ESFDB 1997 
to the Estates was undiminished by the effects of Louis XIV's wars. In their remarques of 
1718, the alcades complained that the ilus had been favouring courtiers and by 1724 they 
even went as far as to argue 'qu'il sera mGme ordonnk que les deniers des bourguignons, 
lors des emprunts, seront pris par preference'."5 Even the governor ran into trouble when 
he pressured the ilus into accepting the investments of his cronies in Paris. As he ruefully 
observed to Rigoley, secretary of the Estates, the ilus had initially protested and 'quand ils 
se sont resolus h le recevoir ils l'ont le plus rnal plack qu'il leur a estk p~ssible'."~ Lending 
to the Estates was thus sufficiently attractive to be treated almost as if it were a local 
privilege by the Burgundians. Their confidence derived from the competitive rate of 
interest, rarely below denier 20, and the reliable repayments which, as we have seen, 
amounted to over 1,184,778 livres for the triennalite'of 1689-91."' 
That was by no means an exceptional event, as can be gauged from looking at the 
evidence from the reign as a whole. During the triennalite' of 1677-9, the klus borrowed 
the parlement of Dijon, M. Antoine Bernard de Massal, president in the chambre des comptes of 
Dijon, M. QuarrC d'Aligny, procureur ghnhal of the parlement of Dijon, M. Jacques Berbue, 
seigneur de Longcourt, abbk de la Rochefoucault, dame Tesulle de La Loge and the duchesse des 
Force. 
'l5 ADCO C 3049, fol. 513. Similar demands were voiced by the legal advisers of the Estates, the 
conseils des e'tats: ibzd., fol. 519. 
'l6 [Dijon,] B[ibliothkque] Mrunicipale del D[ijon] MS 2239, fol. 292, Condk to Rigoley, 10 August 
1690. 
"' ADCO C 3041, fols. 39-40. 
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1,041,200 livres, which formed 18 per cent of its total revenue of 5,882,311 livre~.' '~ In their 
remarques, the alcades noted that the province owed 502,000 livres in 1677, to  which the 
new loans had to be added. However, 
sur lesquelles sommes messieurs les klus ont acquittd 417,650 livres, scavoir 162,000 
livres restant des contrats des annkes 1673, 1674, 1675 et 1676 et sur celuy du 8 mars 
1676 255,650 li~res."~ 
As a result, they calculated that in January 1679 the province owed 1,124,550 livres. 
Unfortunately, it was rare for the alcades to be so precise in their estimates of the Estates' 
debts, and repayments were made from different caisses, such as that for the gamisons or  
don gratuit ordinaire, and we generally possess only the overall totals, not an itemised 
breakdown of where funds were allocated.120 
We can nevertheless be certain that large sums were reimbursed every year, and it is 
also possible to  shed light on how this was achieved. The explanation lies, in part, with the 
other sources of income possessed by the Estates. The remarques of 1691 demonstrate that 
some 1,185,455 livres (16.12 per cent) of its revenues were from indirect or other taxes 
alienated by the crown to  the benefit of the province.121 These amounts would again appear 
to  be representative of the period as a whole. In 1693, the octrois on the River SaBne and 
the m e s  imposed on the sale of salt produced 884,724 livres (21 per cent) of total 
revenue;lZ2 in 1696, 475,108 livres (13 per cent) out of total revenue of 4,145,032 Livres came 
from this source;'23 and the figures for 1700 and 1701 were 511,982 livres (16 per cent) of 
3,239,908 l i v ~ e s l ~ ~  and 526,344 Livres (14 per cent) of 3,774,887 livres respectively.'25 These 
were significant contributions to  the annual budget and they were also vital to the 
borrowing pattern of the Estates. 
Under Louis XIV, the duchy was subject to  the 'grande gabelle', but the king had 
granted the Estates the right to impose an additional tax, or  m e  on salt sold in the 
province.126 Traditionally the crues of 40 and 50 sols produced 9 livres per minot sold.12' In 
1694, the king created a new crue of 20 sols which was alienated in perpetuity to  the Estates 
by a declaration of 14 August 1697 in return for a cash advance of 352,000 1 i ~ r e s . l ~ ~  As the 
combined annual income from the mues was usually in the region of 300,000 livres, it 
Ibid., fols. 45-6. 
"9 Ibid., fols. 48-9. 
Iz0 The registers of the ilus confirm that substantial sums were refunded (e.g., ADCO C 3137, fols. 
83-4), and I hope to give some estimates in the near future. 
ADCO C 3041, f0I. 39-42. 
12' We should, however, be aware that 1693 was a windfall year because some 230,000 livres had 
been advanced as an interest free loan to the Estates by the tax-farmer, Gerard, as part of his lease 
of the octrois. 
lZ3 Ibzd., fol. 250. 
lZ4 Ibzd., fols. 311-12. 
125 Ibid., fols. 3 18-19. 
lZ6 For details of the crues and the operation of the gabelle in Burgundy, see: Arbassier, L'intendant 
Bouchu, pp. 64-5; Ligou, L 'intendance de Bourgogne, p. 191; and Thomas, Une province sous Louis 
XIV, pp. 81-2. 
12' A minot represented 72 litres or 100 livres in weight. 
lZs ADCO C 2982, fol. 388. 
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offered the klus useful collateral for their borrowing and a means of financing other 
projects. A portion was always allocated to the payment of the don gratrrit extraordinaire, 
but during the 1670s the crues had also helped to pay off the debts of the towns and villages 
of the province.'29 
The octrois on the River Sa8ne provided a further source of revenue for the Estates. 
The SaBne was the principal commercial thoroughfare in Burgundy, carrying goods down 
to the city of Lyon and beyond. Taxing the merchandise passing along the river was 
potentially lucrative, and in 1663 the Estates had petitioned the king for the right to levy 
octrois in order to assist in the repayment of the debts of the towns and villages.lM Once 
this had been accomplished, the octrois were abolished in 1681, only to reappear in 1689 to 
the profit of the king. As we have seen, Louis XIV alienated one half of the octrois in that 
year to the Estates in order to pay the secours extraordinaire of 800,000 livres, and in 1691 
he increased their interest to three-quarters.131 Once in possession of the right to collect the 
octrois, the dus, in consultation with the governor and contr6leur gknei-al, farmed that right 
to the highest bidder."' It was a system that endured without serious modification until 
1789. The octrois produced a significant income for the Estates. In the five-year lease signed 
with the sieur Gerard in August 1691, the latter agreed to pay 175,000 livres annually, and 
by the early 1700s that sum had risen to 220,000 livres. 
The Estates thus enjoyed substantial revenues that were independent of direct 
taxation and they used these resources to finance their borrowing. The alcades described 
the system neatly in their remarques of 1679. They estimated the provinces total debt as 
1,124,550 livres, and noted that the 
deux crues de sel de 50s qui peuvent produire par estimation 123,750 livres surquoy 
deduisant les intCrgts qu'il faudra payer et qui montront 56,227 livres ne restera que la 
somme de 67,522 livres laquelle deduisant sur les principaux ne resteront que pour un 
1,047,027 livres."' 
They also looked forward to 1680, predicting a surplus of 205,000 livres 'dont prelevant 
52,35 1 livres pour l'intkrit reste la somme de 152,649 livres pour amortir les principaux qui 
ne resteront plus que pour 894,368 livres'. They repeated this accounting exercise for 1681 
and 1682, when the current royal grant of the crues expired. Their calculations were 
somewhat fanciful because they did not take into account future borrowing, but they do 
offer a snapshot both of the size of the debt and of how they envisaged extinguishing it. 
The proceeds from the ewes were increasingly directed towards servicing the debt, 
and in a letter written in May 1687 the intendant, d'Harlay, informed the contrdleur 
ginha1 that 'depuis longtemps ces crues ont aussy toujours kt6 consommCes d'avance d'une 
'l9 ADCO C 3049, fols. 42-3. 
130 In addition to the registers of the Estates, the observations of Mesnard de Conichard, premier 
commis of the contrdleur gknhal under Louis XV, are especially instructive in regard to the 
origins and use of the octrois. See ADCO C 3349, Mesnard de Conichard to president Fontette, 5 
July 1764. 
13' ADCO C3134, fols. 190-1 and C 3136. 
13' A D C 0  C 3134, fols. 233-4, Condk to the ifus, August 1691. 
ADCO C 3049, fol. 49. It is interesting to note that when the alcades made these calculations 
they assumed that the whole debt was subject to interest payments of denier 20 (5%). 
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triennalitk i l'autre'.lJ4 In other words, the ilus of 1685-8 were borrowing against the 
proceeds of the crues for 1689-91. D'Harlay continued, 
on ne scauroit s'en servir pour le temps et l'usage pour, lequel on les a demandCes et 
obtenues qu'en empruntant d'annke en annke, comme il se pratique sur l'affectation du 
fonds de ces crues, pour rembourser dans la triennalitk suivante a mesure de leur 
existence. 
By 1691, the Estates were struggling to live within their means and the granting of 
the octrois was designed to make further borrowing possible. Yet the sheer scale of the 
demands made upon the province in the last twenty-five years of the reign saw these 
resources exploited to their limits. If we take the case of the mes, it is clear that before 
1688 they had been confirmed at the beginning of every triennalite' for the next three years 
to pay for the don gratuit extraordindire, the debts of the towns and even to reimburse part 
of the Estates' debt. Thus in 1688, the crues were extended until the end of 1692, and in 
1691 that term was increased until the end of 1696. A similar pattern was maintained until 
1700; thereafter the consumption of the crues accelerated. In 1700, they were accorded until 
January 1708, by 1709 they were granted until December 1719 and in 1715 were consumed 
until 31 December 1732. An almost identical picture can be seen in the case of the octrois. 
Granted by the king in 1691 until the end of 1696, they had by 1700 been extended until 
the end of 1707. The War of the Spanish Succession destroyed any semblance of balance, 
and by 1705 Louis XIV had granted the octrois until 1719, extending this further in 1710 
until the end of 1748! 
In order to weather the fiscal storm, the bus had therefore been obliged to pledge 
future revenues for decades in advance. In 1718, the province's debt was estimated at just 
over 1 million l iv re~ ,~ '~  but this figure does not take into account the fact that the revenues 
for the crues and octrois had been consumed in advance for some fifteen and thirty years 
respectively. Taken together, that represented nearer 11 million livres of income that had 
already been spent.136 Here we have a more accurate assessment of the price paid by 
Burgundy for Louis XIV's wars than that offered by Dumont, and to put it into 
perspective it is worth comparing it with the debt on the eve of the Revolution."' At the 
end of the American War of Independence, the alcades reported a debt of 29,519,378 
l i v r e ~ ' ~ ~  for borrowing carried out on behalf of the government. Although enormous, this 
sum caused no real concern because both the interest and the repayments of the principal 
were covered by the alienation of existing taxes, such as the capitation and vingtitmes, to 
the advantage of the Estates. The debt of the Estates proper, that is to say of borrowing for 
regular fiscal and administrative purposes, was separate and stood at only 9,852,312 livres. 
If our estimate of the debt bequeathed by Louis XTV is correct, then the province was 
'j4 AN G7 157, fol. 55, dYHarlay to Pontchartrain, 19 May 1687. 
"' Dumont, Une session des itats, p. 4. 
'l6 These are only general estimates based on 15 years of income from the crues (approx. 300,000 
livres annually) which ought to have been in the region of 4,500,000 livres, and 30 years of the 
octrois (approx. 220,000 limes annually) worth perhaps 6,600,000 livres. I hope to be able to give a 
more precise figure soon. 
'" I hope to expand this theme further in my broader study of the Estates between 1661 and 1790. 
'j8 ADC0 C 3306, fol. 221. 
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arguably in a healthier fiscal position on the eve of the Revolution than it had been in 
1715. 
Clearly, such comparisons are of limited value, but the remarques of 1784 reveal 
how the monarchy used the superior credit of the Estates to borrow on a massive scale in 
the second half of the eighteenth century. In 1714, Louis XIV forced the Estates to offer 
him a 'loan' of 2,000,000 livres, but this was exceptional; instead the crown used a series of 
other expedients to draw money from the province. As elsewhere in the kingdom, the 
government employed the classic ruses of augmentation des gages and the creation of offices 
to tap the wealth of the members of the parlement, chambre des comptes and other courts. 
These measures could have an effect upon the fiscal policies of the 61ns by reducing the 
capital available for lending to the Estates. For example, in 1691, the governor was obliged 
to inform the contr6letlr gknbral that money could not be raised to cover the &tapes because 
of 'des grandes sommes que les nouvelles criations ont tirC des bourses de la province'.139 
There were many other methods of forcing the province to provide funds. One of 
the most common was the creation of unnecessary or threatening offices with the aim of 
persuading the Estates to pay for their suppression. With so much of the local economy 
dependent upon viticulture, a favourite royal tactic was to invent new offices such as 
commissioners and 'courtiers des vins', as in 1691, or 'jaugeurs du vin', as occurred in both 
1696 and 1706. These were accompanied by a host of other offices such as grefiers or 
commis for the various couns and municipal authorities in Burgundy. In order to make 
them attractive, these offices were sold with privileges and exemptions, notably from the 
taille or the obligation to billet troops, and were not surprisingly unpopular with the 
Estates.I4' To  block these creations, the &S advanced an equivalent sum to the crown, and 
frequently the amounts needed were substantial. Some 250,000 livres was paid in 1691, a 
further 311,539 livres two years later, another 331,418 livres in 1696, a massive 922,000 
livres in 1700,491,000 livres in 1703 and no less than 682,000 livres in 1706. These examples 
are not meant to be exhaustive, simply to illustrate the size of the sums involved and the 
regularity with which the government resorted to such measures. Usually the Estates paid 
for the suppression of these offices, although occasionally they could be bought en masse 
by the Estates themselves. The classic example is that of the offices of maire, which were 
made venal in 1692 and were bought by the hlus four years later with important 
consequences for the Estates. 
When using these methods to raise funds, the king generally allowed the 
suppression of any given office in return for hard cash and, as we might expect, offered the 
blus a further extension of their right to the m e s  or the octrois on the River Sabne. Here, in 
part, lies the explanation for why these funds had been consumed so far in advance by 
1715, although it also reflects the fact that it was easier for the crown to have access to the 
funds of the local elite through the borrowing of the Estates than via the politically risky 
route of taxation. 
AN G7 157, fol. 188, Condk to Pontchartrain, 6 June 1691. 
14' Complaints about the excessive number of individuals claiming exemption were a perennial 
feature of the meetings of the Estates and of their remonstrances. The remarques of 1709 and 1712 
both provide good examples: ADC0 C 3030, fols. 544,603-4. 
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From this discussion of the fiscal system in Burgundy during the reign of Louis XIV it is 
possible to  draw a number of conclusions. Despite the dramatic growth of direct taxation 
and the use of numerous expedients, such as forced loans, the btapes and the creation of 
offices, there was no serious opposition from the Estates. The emasculation of the 
previously vocal third estate as a result of the extension of venality to the office of maire 
undoubtedly contributed by cutting off the one avenue by which the interests of the 
taillables could be expressed. Without an active third estate to trouble their consciences, the 
two privileged orders offered no public signs of dissent in the face of government demands. 
By 1715, the Estates were politically mute and it was not until the reign of Louis XVI that 
signs of renewed vitality would be detected. Indeed the last years of the sun king's reign 
had already produced the first indications of where future opposition to the financial 
policies of the crown would be found. It was the parlement of Dijon that remonstrated to 
Louis XIV for the suppression of charges established during the wars, imploring him to 
'soulager ses sujets epuisCs, et accablis par le poids d'une longue guerre'.141 Days before the 
king's death, in August 1715, it sent further remonstrances protesting the continued levy of 
the capitation and dixi2me and lamenting their effects upon a province ruined by the winter 
of 1709 and the pestilence that had ravaged local livestock in 1714. The judges declared, 
que les peuples de cette province qui s'attendoient que la paix gknkralle feroit cesser la 
levke du dixiesme et de la capitation, en regardent la continuation comme une surcharge 
qui renverse le reste de leur fortune, il aneantit touttes leurs esperances.14* 
This is not the place to  consider the motives of the parfementaires, although their registers 
contain plenty of self-interested whining about the non-payment of their gages. What is 
important is that even before the death of Louis XIV, they were manoeuvring themselves 
into position as the would-be defenders of the taxpayers in the province, a role they would 
assume with increasing fervour as the eighteenth century progressed. 
These rumblings were still scarcely audible in 1715, and there is no doubt that Louis 
XIV had avoided serious opposition to his fiscal policies because they had worked largely 
to the advantage of the Burgundian propertied and office-owning elites. Direct taxation in 
the form of the capitation had been introduced, but the system of abonnement ensured that 
the principal burden was borne by the taillables, who paid the bulk of the tax while 
simultaneously supporting the interest payments incurred on the advances made to the 
government. The dixi2me was not initially subject to  an abonnement and probably weighed 
more heavily upon the privileged groups, which might explain the parlement's 
remonstrances in 1715. If this was the case, the monarchy quickly learnt its lesson and 
when the tax reappeared in 1734 the ifus were able to contract an advantageous 
abonnement. 
Otherwise there was little reason for the local elites to be dissatisfied. Although the 
crown used every conceivable expedient to raise funds, such as the secours extraordinaire, 
failing to  fund the btapes, imposing forced loans or by obliging the Estates to  'buy out' 
unwanted offices, it always offered some help towards meeting the expense. Rather than 
"l AN, U 1062,5 June 1714. 
l' Ibd., 19 August 1715; R. J. Bonney, 'Le secret de leursfamiffes: The Fiscal and Social Limits of 
Louis XW's dixiime', French History, 7 (1993), 398. Ibid., p. 399 for an abonnement proposal in 
May 1715. 
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pass the full cost directly onto the taillables, the Estates were able to borrow using the 
income from the crues on the sale of salt, or octrois on the commerce of the SaBne as 
collateral. Admittedly the interest on these loans was generally added to the taille, but it 
was far from exclusively the case and, for example, when the king obliged the dus to 
advance him 2.4 million livres in 1710 in return for a reduction in the abonnement for the 
capitation, he also agreed that 120,000 livres could be retained from the remaining sum of 
600,000 livres to pay 'les arrkrages'.14' In this instance, as in many others, it was the crown, 
not the Estates, that was sacrificing its future revenues for the short-term fix of a cash 
advance. Here were the outlines of the system that would be most fully exploited during 
the Seven Years War and the War of American Independence with pernicious 
consequences for the royal treasury. 
As a means of raising money in moments of crisis it was, however, highly effective 
because of the widespread confidence in the credit-worthiness of the Estates. Despite 
consuming the revenue of the crues and octrois for decades in advance, the investing public 
retained its faith in a system that continued to ensure prompt repayment. Even in the most 
difficult years, the dus found the funds to cover interest charges and to reimburse a portion 
of the principal. There can have been few propertied families in Burgundy, noble or 
otherwise, who did not invest a part of their fortune into the provincial debt. When 
referring to borrowing to pay the &tapes, the intendant, d'Harlay, inadvertently provided 
part of the explanation for their behaviour. He  wrote, 
que l'on tient un compte tellement exact de toutes les dkpenses de la province, depuis la 
plus grandes jusques B la plus petite, ne s'en faisant aucune sans ordonnance enregistrke 
de mm. les klus, qu'il n'y a rien de cet espece, dont le roy ne puisse &re inform6 en un 
moment quand il vous plaira. 
The province's investors shared his confidence, and there could be no better testimony to 
that faith than their demands in 1724 that Burgundians be given preference when drawing 
up the lists of subscribers to  the Estates' loans. Unlike the monarchy, the Estates emerged 
from the wars of Louis XIV with its reputation for fiscal integrity intact. 
14' ADC0 C 5573. 
14' AN G7 157, fol. 55, d'Harlay to Pontchartrain, 19 May 1687. 
